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BASIC CRITERIA FOR DISTINGUISHING REVENUE
CHARGES FROM CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
IN INCOME TAX COMPUTATIONS
Abe L. Shugerman*

I
INTRODUCTION

O

NE of the most prolific sources of tax litigation has been the problem of distinguishing capital expenditures from revenue charges.1
The nature of the problem can best be illustrated by reference
to the table below..

Year

Nee Income,
Before Deducting
Cose of
An Asset's Use

Deductions (Debits) For Asset's Use
Asset Capitalized
(A)

$20,000
28,000
23,000
18,000
25,000

Expense
$2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000

Cose of Asset

$10,000

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949

Nee
Income
$18,000
26,000
21,000
16,000
23,000

Asset Immediately
Charged co Revenue
(B)

Expense
$10,000
0
0
0
0

Nee
Income
$10,000
28,000
23,000
18,000
25,000

$10,000

Total Nee In~
come for 1945~
49

$104,000

$104,000

The above table presupposes a $10,000 asset purchased in 1945,
possessing no salvage value, and depreciated over· a fiv~year period on
a straight-line basis. It can readily be seen that an immediate revenue
charge (Column B) produces a lower net income in the purchase year
(1945) than a capitalization (Column A). On the other hand, a capitalization produces lower yearly incomes in subsequent years, and no
one single year thereby feels a large expense impact (as happened·
~ Member, Alabama, Kentucky, and Florida bars. Assistant Professor of Accounting,
Western Reserve University.-Ed.
1 See I.R.C. §§23(a) and 24(a); Treas. Reg. 111, §§29.23(a)-l to 29.23(a)-16, incl.
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in 1945 when there was an immediate revenue charge). It should
also be. noted that, provided the Internal Revenue Code requirements
have been met, eventually the taxpayer gets the same total deductions
($10,000 in the above table) regardless of whether he capitalizes a
- cost or charges it immediately to revenue. However, as is also indicated
in the above table, the individual taxable income between specific
years will vary as between these two methods.
In the sections that follow, every effort has been made to deduce the
motivating philosophy behind the judicial decisions that have been rendered on this question. Courts, themselves, have never paused to prescribe any detailed criteria to be applied,- but an examination of the
opinions has revealed that consciously or unconsciously the courts have
been moved by such basic criteria. Even though such criteria may not
have been precisely designated, they have been present, they have been
utilized, and interestingly· enough,. the courts have been amazingly
consistent in their applications of these criteria.
In the sections that follow, also, the word "court" has been used in a
ge~eric sense to include both the Tax Court (formerly the Board of Tax
Appeals) and the federal courts having jurisdiction over tax matters.
Criteria, once determined, have been evaluated as to the apparent relative weight that has been assigned to them by the courts; and they have
also been evaluated as to their appropriateness to the general legal
fabric. The question under consideration involves one of those many
areas of law that will always have a zone of contention wherein a certain amount of litigation will be necessary. However, by a careful study
and utilization of the basic criteria applicable to these kinds of expenditures, it is believed that the area of this zone can be considerably narrowed. It is improbable that litigation in this area can be entirely eliminated, but it can certainly be minimized.
The source of this litigation dates back to a very early period; and
during the earlier years of the income tax law, the Board of Tax Appeals rendered its famous Illinois Merchants Trust Co.2 opinion. That
case exerted an immense influence on subsequent developments, and,
in a general way, set forth the embryonic criteria. Thus, in roughly
delineating capital and revenue charges, the court stated:
"In determining whether an expenditure is a capital one or is
chargeable against operating income, it is necessary to bear in mind
the purpose for which the expenditure was made. To repair is to
restore to a sound state or to_ mend, while a replacement connotes
2

4 B.T.A. 103 (acq.) (1926).
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a substitution. A repair is an expenditure for the purpose of keeping the property in an ordinarily efficient operating condition. It
does not add to the value of the property, nor does it appreciably
prolong its life. It merely keeps the property in an operating condition over its probable useful life for the uses for which -it was
acquired. Expenditures for that purpose are distinguishable from
those for replacements, alterations, improvements or additions
which prolong the life of the property, increase its value, or make
it adaptable to a different use. The one is a maintenance charge,
while the others are additions to capital investment which should
not be applied against current eamings."3
From this point, later litigation was to establish more precise criteria.

II
THE

CREATION OF A

NEW UNIT

The creation of a new unit is probably one of the most (if not the
most) important of all criteria. It is also the criteria· that has probably been the real focal point of the largest number of contested cases,
and this volume of litigation has fortunately produced underlying principles that are available for demarcating a new unit from a mere renovated old unit.
The demarcation is important, for a mere renovation usually involves a revenue charge whereas the creatiqn of a new unit warrants a
capitalization. Briefly, there are three alternative criteria that have been
used to establish an outlay as creating a new unit (and therefore a capital charge); and thus, the presence of any one of these three criteria
will justify a capitalization. Briefly also, these criteria are respectively
(I) the replacement of an interchangeable mechanism in an asset with
a new interchangeable part, (2) the replacement of a major segment
of a structure, or (3) substantial reconstrnction of an asset. There is a
considerable amount of authority supporting each of these views, and
each one will accordingly be analyzed separately.
First, the new unit may replace an interchangeable part of an asset.
Such an interchangeable part must be a distinct mechanism itself possessing substantially equal usefulness whether used in its present location or elsewhere. As such, it must be capable of detachment and use
elsewhere with equal facility in its detached form. Where an individual
interchangeable part is thus replaced, the replacement is regarded as
a new unit that must be capitalized.- Under this approach, the following
8

Id. at 106.
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have been required to be capitalized: replacement of a motor pump;4
new heaters;5 replacing window screens and screen doors; 6 and replacement of an oil bumer.7 In these instances, the replaced mechanism was
distinct enough to be regarded as never having been really accessioned
into some larger asset.
Closely related to interchangeability is the second criterion, viz., a
replacement of a major part of a structure. Here, the replaced structure
is not an interchangeable type of mechanism, but rather represents costs
so entwined with the major structure as to have become accessioned to
it. Where such a replacement of accessioned property takes place,
courts have required that the replaced structure be .a substantial segment of the main property before they would adjudicate a capitalization.
In contrast, courts have not insisted that interchangeable parts be of
such a substantial part of the main property, and herein lies the difference in approach between interchangeable mechanisms and replacing
structures. This difference is a fine one, but nevertheless it is a distinction that has been applied.
The following are examples of (second criterion) accessioned replacement structural costs of a substantial scope that necessitated capitalization: cost of replacing an electrical system;8 replacing a drainage
pipe;9 replacement of old doors with new overhead doors,1° rewiring;11
replacement of a store front; 12 a new brick foundation for a building;13
concrete walls to replace wooden ones;14 replacement of wooden bridges
and culverts with concrete and steel structures;15 removal of old doors
and replacing them with others offering better fire and burglary protection;16 and the replacement of iron piping with brass piping in the
hot water system of an office building.17 In each of these instances,
a substantial segment of the property was replaced. In contrast, a
mere placing of fresh material in place of worn out material is
4 Covington Cotton Oil Co., 12 B.T.A.
5 Galvin Furniture Co., B.T.A. Memo.
6 Alexander Sprunt and Sons, Inc., 24

1018 (acq.) (1928).
Op. Dkt. 104,062, April 7, 1942.
B.T.A. 599 (1931).
7Republican Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op., Dkts. 61,235 and 66,238, Feb. 20, 1934.
SFirst National Bank in Mobile, 30 B.T.A. 632 (1934) •.
9 Covington Cotton Oil Co., 12 B.T.A. 1018 (a~q.) (1928).
10 Acme Pie Co. of Cleveland, Ohio, 5 T.C.M. 760 (1946).
11 Alexander Sprunt and Sons, Inc., 24 B.T.A. 599 (1931).
12 Foer Wall Paper Co., 9 B.T.A. 377 (acq.) (1927).
13 Crocker First National Bank of San Francisco v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1932)
59 F. (2d) 37.
14 Alexander Sprunt and Sons, Inc., 24 B.T.A. 599 (1931).
15 Grand Rapids and Indiana Ry. Co. v. Doyle, (D.C. Mich. 1915) 245 F. 792.
16 Leedom and Worrall Co., 10 B.T.A. 825 (1928).
11 Fire Companies Building Corp. v. Burnet, (D.C. Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 943.

1950]

REVENUE CHARGES AND CAPITAL EXPENDJ.TtlRES

217

not enough, per se, to justify a capitalization. For example, the replacement of a single shingle18 would be a repair whereas an entire new
roof would be capitalized.19 Here, as elsewhere, an isolated sporadic
case20 may arise and permit a revenue charge where a major part of a
structure has been replaced. The overwhelming weight of authority,
though, is that a replacement of a major structural segment of an asset
justifies a capitalization.21
· ·
Thirdly, the new unit may be a reconstruction of an old asset so
that the rebuilt asset possesses attributes appreciably different from its
original qualities. Because of these different attributes, the rebuilt
asset becomes, in effect, a new parcel of property distinct from the
original asset. The original asset has merely furnished part of the raw
material, which has been merged with other material and labor to produce an entirely new property alloy. Thus, the following have been
held capitalizable under this view: rebuilding a store front; 22 remodeling a display case so that it was of a different type; 23 cost of bricking up
windows in a wall to strengthen it;24 cutting new windows; 25 and
strengthening the foundation of a building.26 Thus, the reconstruction
of property seems clearly to be grounds for capita-lization.27 Also, in this
same vein, a new unit may be a distinct parcel of property that has been
fastened on to a larger asset. Here, again, a new unit has been created
by a reconstruction process, wherein the original asset has been welded
to other property to result in an asset completely different from the
original property. Accordingly, the cost of this new accessioned prop-.
erty is capitalized. Under such an approach, the following charges have
been adjudicated to be capital items: warehouse or shed for storage purposes;28 new front on a building and additions thereto;29 new pipes in
18 Louise Kingsley,

11 B.T.A. 296 (acq.) (1928).
5 T.C.M. 849 (1946); Croker Co., Inc., 15 B.T.A. 175 (acq.) (1929);
Appeal of Georgia Car and Locomotive Co., 2 B.T.A. 986 (1925); Thomas J. Locke,
8 B.T.A. 534 (1927); Salo Auerbach, 2 B.T.A. 67 (1925).
20 Appollo Steel Co., 4 T.C.M. 387 (1945).
21 Also, see dissenting opinion in American Bemberg Corp., 10 T. C. 361 (1948), for
an interesting enunciation of this replacing unit theory.
22 Foer Wall Paper Co., 9 B.T.A. 377 (acq.) (1927).
2s Leedom and Worrall Co., 10 B.T.A. 825 (1928).
24 Marble and Shattuck Chair Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1930) 39 F. (2d) 393.
25 Appeal of Yost and Herrell, 2 B.T.A. 745 (acq.) (1925).
2 6 Seaman-Patrick Paper Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 41,894, Aug. 27, 1930.
27 However, see The Commodore, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 718 (1942) for an apparently
isolated view.
2 8 Covington Cotton Oil Co., 12 B.T.A. 1018 (acq.) (1928).
29 Johnston Mfg. Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op., Dkt. t0l,053, April 23, 1941.
1 9 Ritter,
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a factory; 30 library shelves;31 new appurtenances to a boiler;32 cost of a
hog house; 33 new walls and skylights;34 expenditures to increase a newspaper's circulation;3~ cost of obtaining new customers for a public
· utility; 36 and ·costs of novelty banks distributed to obtain new bank deposits.37 In these instances, property was added that did not exist before and which did not replace similar property. These costs effected
a reconstruction, created new assets (units), and were accordingly properly capitalized.
·
Finally, it is well to note that the capitalizations resulting from any
of the three above new unit criteria need not necessarily be accompanied by an increase· in the assets' values. 38 There are any number.
of cases requiring a capitalization even though there is either a diminution in market value because of the changes effectep.39 or a diminution
in the asset's usefulness to its owner.40
In summary, the courts have assigned considerable weight to the
new unit criteria. Where a new unit has been created, a court will be
very strongly inclined to adjudicate the expenditures involved as capital
items. As noted at the outset, such new units may be created either
by (I) the replacement of an interchangeable mechanism used in an
asset; (2) the replacement of a major segment of a structure; or (3) the
substantial reconstruction of an asset. Any single sub-criterion will
justify a capitalization, and such a capitalization will be warranted even
though a diminution in the asset's market value or usefulness occurs.
In many instances, also, as may be noted from the cases above, a new
unit may be created by virtue of two or even· three of the new unit
sub-criteria, and such instances present extremely compelling cases for
capitalization.
80 Galvin Furniture Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 104,062, April 7, 1942.
31 Beaudry v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 20.
82 Acme Pie Co. of Cleveland, Ohio, 5 T.C.M. 760 (1946).
33 Mills, 4 T.C.M. 863 (1945).
84 St. Louis Malleable Casting Co., 9 B.T.A. 110 (1927).
35Willcuts v. Minnesota Tribune Co., (8th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 947, cert. den.
308 U.S. 577, 60 S.Ct. 93 (1939).
36 Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 814,
cert. den. 302 U.S. 722, 58 S.Ct. 43 (1937).
87Liberty Ins. Bank, 14 B.T.A. 1428 (1929), reversed on other issues in (6th Cir.
1932) 59 F. (2d) 320.
88 For an apparently isolated contra view see E. L. Potter, 20 B.T.A. 252 at 254
(nonacq.) (1930), wherein the court said: "There was no remodeling, and there were no
alterations, replacements or additions tending to materially increase the value of the praperty."
.
39 Parkersburg Iron and Steel Co. v. Burnet, (4th Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 163.
40Beaven, 6 T.C.M. 1344 (1947); Appeals of Derbyshire, 2 B.T.A. 414 (1925).
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ill
RENOVATION OF A SERVICEABLE AssET TO !Ts ORIGINAL CONDITION

There has been a noticeably strong inclination by courts to permit
a revenue charge where a serviceable asset is merely renovated to its
original condition. However, there are three preliminary conjunctive
conditions (all of which must be present) in order for this criterion to
be applicable. Briefly, these conditions are (1) an asset must be in
serviceable condition before the renovation starts; (2) a "skeleton,"
base, or some vestige of the asset must be present and must form the
starting point for the renovation; and (3) the net effect of the renovation must produce an asset substantially like the original construction
of the asset as it existed before the renovation began. Each of these
three preliminary conditions has been illustrated by a respectable
amount of authority, and each such condition will accordingly be
discussed below.
First, the asset must be in a serviceable condition before the renovation starts. This requirement was emphasized in the following cases,
where previously serviceable assets were renovated and the expenditures were held to be revenue charges: repairs to roofs,41 windows,42
and ceilings;43 pointing. loose bricks;44 installing new stairway supports;45 mending leaks and plastering;46 repairing skylights in a roof;47
painting;48 and repairing sidewalk lights.49 In each instance, the asset
was serviceable before the repairs were made. As will be seen in Part
IV below, a court becomes strongly inclined to rule an expenditure
a capital charge if the renovated asset was unserviceable before such
renovations were started. This distinction in the initial status of the
renovated property, therefore, becomes very important, although there
appears to be no genuinely rational basis for the apparent rule.
Secondly, it is quite necessary that some "skeleton," base, or vestige
of the original asset be present, and that such "skeleton" forms the
starting point for the renovations. This prerequisite was vividly illus41 North Street Trust, 6 B.T.A. 947 (acq.) (1927).
Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Poer Wall Paper Co., 9 B.T.A. 377 (acq.) (1927).
47 The Fidelity Storage Corp. v. Burnet, (D.C. Cir. 1932) 58 F. (2d) 526.
48 Crocker Co., Inc., 15 B.T.A. 175 (acq.) (1929).
49 Ibid.
42
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trated in The Fidelity Storage Corp. v. Burnet!5° wherein skylights of
a roof had to be virtually rebuilt. The skeleton of "the old skylight was
retained rather than .being replaced, and repairs were made directly
on to this skeleton. These expenditures were held to be revenue
charges, and the court stated: "But there was no substitution of a different material. The new material was used where necessary to replace
that which had become deteriorated by the elements and become
worthless. "51
·
In the same case, some deteriorated grills were removed and replaced, and the court, in ruling these costs capitalizable, said, "no
attempt was made to repair the original ones, but they were replaced
by new grills of a different and heavier design."52
Likewise, the following in toto replacements have been held capitalizable: replacing a pump with a secondhand pump that was acquired
at about the same cost as repairs required for the old one;53 and replacing a wooden railroad siding with a new one.54
In general, these cases reflect the doctrine of the Illinois Merchants
Trust Co./ 5 noted in Part I above. Thus, where a skeleton is
retained it is arguable that the asset is being restored, ab initio, to its
original form; but, where a completely new parcel of property is installed, then this becomes a distinct, new asset, rather than a mere
restoration.
Thirdly, the finished, renovated asset must be substantially like the
repaired asset as it appeared in its original condition; and a perusal of
the cases seems to indicate that original condition means either its status
when the asset was new or its status just before the renovations started.
A number of cases have arisen illustrating this requirement, and quite
large outlays have been permitted as revenue classifications where the
objective was a mere restoration of the property to its original condition.
For example, in Claremont Waste Mfg. Co.,56 a building's underpinnings were damaged by a Hood water, and a continued use of the
building required the restoration of these underpinnings. In allowing
a revenue classification for these restoration expenditures, _the court
said: "After the repairs, the building was used for the same purposes
50 (D.C. Cir.
51 Id. at 528.
52 Ibid.

1932) 58 F. (2d) 526.

Accord: Ritter, 5 T.C.M. 849 (1946).
Cotton Oil Co., 12 B.T.A. 1018 (1928).
54 Henry M. Jones, 4 B.T.A. 1286 (1926).
55 4 B.T.A. 103 (acq.) (1926).
56 Claremont Waste Mfg. Co., 4 T.C.M. 301 (1945).
53 Covington
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as before, and it was no better adapted for that use than it was before
the damage occurred."57
In another case, In re Gopcevic,58 subsiding soil made it necessary
to realign the roof supports. These expenditures were allowed as
revenue charges, the court remarking, "The estimated useful life of the
property was not increased by the treatment of the roof supports-it
was only brought back to its original span."59
In Appollo Steel Co.,60 rotor bar windings (amounting to 25% of
the original cost of the motor) were allowed as revenue charges. The
court, in that case, stated: "The replacement of motor bars in the motor
did not appreciably increase the value, prolong the life, or increase the
efficiency of the motor as originally installed."61
In a similar vein, the following expenditures illustrating this third
requirement have been allowed as revenue charges: cost of restoring
a reservoir to a usable condition after a cave-in;62 repairing a main drive
belt that had slipped off and become damaged; 63 stopping leaks in a roof
and wall of a building (where such repairs amounted to 35% of the
building's initial value); 64 resurfacing a B.oor;65 patching, plastering,
and repainting walls that had become broken and discolored;66 replacing foundation timbers; 67 reworking a foundation to stop cave-ins;68
cost of reconditioning a barge that had been sunk;69 and, of course, the
57 Id. at 303.
58 3 T.C.M. 1216 (1944).
59 Id. at 1217.
60 4 T.C.M. 387 (1945).
61Id.

at 391.

62 Henderson Cotton Mills, 4 B.T.A.
63 Franklin Mills, 7 B.T.A. 1290 at

1212 {acq.) (1926).
1291 (1927), wherein the court stated that the
expenditure "merely kept the property in an ordinarily efficient operating condition and
did not increase the normal useful life of the belt, or add to its ordinary value."
64 Buckland v. United States, (D.C. Conn. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 681. The court stated
that in spite of the high cost, the nature of the work was a restoration of a damaged fabric,
not extending to the replacement of any serviceable unit of the building.
65 Rose v. Haverty Furniture Co., (5th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 345.
66 Ibid.
67 Forgeus, 6 B.T.A. 291 (1927).
68 American Bemberg Corp., 10 T.C. 361 (1948). The court found that these costs
did not prolong the original useful life of the taxpayers property, did not increase productive
capacity, nor diminish operating costs. The case is of particular interest both because of
its recentness and its well reasoned opinion. At the same time, the facts bring the case
close to being a capitalized charge under the new unit criteria, and such a capitalization
was urged in the dissent In this respect, the dissenting opinion [10 T.C. 361 at 380
(1948)) states: "These large expenditures created a substantial underground structure, a
,part of the plant which did not exist, had no previous counterpart, and was not a part
of the taxpayer's capital previously."
69 Zimmern v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 769 at 769. In rendering its opinion, the court stated: "The cost of repairs was ••• necessary in order 'to restore
the barge to the condition it was in at the time it sank, and so it appears that the expense
was not incurred for additions, improvements, or betterments."
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leading principles enunciated in the famous Illinois Merchants.Trust
Co. case. 70 · This has also been held to include replacements of small
worn out parts in a machine so that the repaired machine was merely
restored to its original condition.71 Thus, the cost of replacing boiler
tubes, 72 the cost of replacing a sugar mill roller 'crusher, 73 and miscellaneous short-lived machine parts74 have all been held proper revenue
charges.
Where, for any reason, an asset different from the original one is ·
produced, a new unit has really been created. And: as indicated in the
analysis in Part II above, new units are capitalizable.
· For example, in Marble and Shattuck Chair Co. v. Commissioner,75
the cost of bricking up windows in a wall to strengthen it and putting
in a ventilating pipe created a different (and therefore new) asset, and
were accordingly capitalizable. On the other hand, in the same case,
costs necessary to ~epair the roof and place it in its original condition
were allowed to be charged to revenue.
In summary, the renovation of a serviceable asset to its original
condition constitutes a revenue charge, provided that the three conjunctive preliminary conditions described above have been met. It
should be emphasized that all three preliminary conditions must be
concurrently present in order for the criterion to be applicable. There
is a creditable amount of authority supporting each phase of the criterion, and it can be deemed a firmly established part of tax law. It
further seems to be within the general philosophical orbit of the Illinois
Merchants Trust Co. 76 case, and it can therefore be rega:i;ded as a logical
part of the tax law.
·

IV
REHABILITATION OF AN UNSERVICEABLE AssET

An examination of the adjudicated cases indicates that a court is
strongly inclined to require a capitalization of expenditures needed to
place unserviceable property in a useful condition. The rule has been
10 4 B.T.A. 103 (acq.) (1926).
71 For an apparently isolated contra

view, see Morris & Bailey Steel Co., 9 B.T.A. 205
(1927).
12 Simons Brick Co., 14 B.T.A. 878 (1928).
73 Hawaiian Sugar Co., 13 B.T.A. 683 (1928).
74 Libby and Blouin, Ltd., 4 B.T.A. 910 (1926); Covington Cotton Oil Co., 12 B.T.A.
1018 (1928).
75 (6th Cir. 1930) 39 F. (2d) 393.
76 4 B.T.A. 103 (acq.) (1926).
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applied with equal force to both real77 and personal78 property; and, in
this respect, the following have been required to be capitalized: rebuilding a train trestle;79 rebuilding a heater;80 rebuilding an inclined
screen frame; 81 reconditioning a farm building and equipment;82 replacement of B.oor supports;83 renovation of a roof;84 placing a building
in a safe condition;85 cost of rebuilding the stem· of a barge;86 cost of
replacing plant units rendered useless through corrosion;87 rebuilding
boilers;88 rebuilding locomotives; 89 and rebuilding a marble cigar
counter that had settled at one end.90 The affirmation of this doctrine
in recent years by appellate courts01 further indicates that tlris criterion
is firmly entrenched in the tax structure.
The courts apparently, howeyer, have engrafted one important exception on to the general rule. Thus, it appears_ that revenue charges
are permitted where the asset is suddenly rendered unserviceable by an
unforeseen event. For example,92 expenditures necessary to repair a
steam shovel that had fallen over an embankment were considered
revenue charges.93 On the other hand, the cost of rebuilding the stem
of a barge ( where the stem had been allowed to rot away gradually)
were held capitalizable.04 These two cases form an interesting, con11 Amsterdam Theatres Corp., 24 B.T.A. 1161 (1931); John A. Schmid, 10 B.T.A.
1152 (acq.) (1928).
78Dougherty v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 269, cert. den. 331
U.S. 834, 67 S.Ct. 1515 (1947); Texas Chemical Co., 11 B.T.A. 390 (1928).
79 Mogg Coal and Coke Co., 10 B.T.A. 588 (acq.) (1928).
80 Smith v. Commissioner, (D.C. N.H. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 377.
81 Jbid.
82 Hunter v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 237, cert. den. 323 U.S.
792, 65 S.Ct. 432 (1945).
83 Amsterdam Theatres Corp., 24 B.T.A. 1161 (1931).
84Jbid.
85 John A. Schmid, 10 B.T.A. 1152 (acq.) (1928).
86Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 269, cert. den. 331
U.S. 838, 67 S.Ct. 1515 (1947).
87 Texas Chemical Co., 11 B.T.A. 390 (1928).
88 Consumers' Ice and Cold Storage Co., 6 B.T.A. 1269 (1927).
89 Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op., Dkts. 38,892, 62,245, Aug. 8, 1939.
90 Ezra
Eaton, 2 B.T.A. 463 (1925).
91 Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, ( 4th Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 269, cert. den. 331
U.S. 838, 67 S.Ct. 1515 (1947); Hunter v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d)
237, cert. den. 323 U.S. 792, 65 S.Ct. 432 (1945).
92 Jefferson Gas Coal Co., 16 B.T.A. 1135 (nonacq.) (1929).
93 Also, in Zimmem v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 769 at 769,
the cost of reconditioning a barge that had been sunk and raised was ruled a revenue
charge in an opinion wherein the court stated: "The cost of repairs was ••• necessary in
order to restore the barge to the condition it was in at the time it sank, and so it appears
that the expense was not incurred for additions, inlprovements, or betterments."
94 Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 269, cert. den.
331 U.S. 838, 67 S.Ct. 1515 (1947).
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trasting pair, since they involve closely similar unserviceable assets
whose unserviceability was caused by different circumstances.
In summary, the criterion seems well established that costs to make
useful an unserviceable asset are capitalizable, provided the unserviceable condition arose through a slow, gradual deterioration process..
There is adequate authority to support this proposition, as noted in the
cases above. In fairness to the situation, however, the emphasis given
to an asset's initial unserviceability and the consideration given to
whether such unserviceability arose gradually or suddenly are tenets
that have no apparent rational basis. These factors are part of the tax
structure, but there seems to be no plausible explanation for their
presence.

V
CoNTEMPORANEousNEss OF WENDITURES

WrrH

AN AssET's

PURCHASE

Immediately after the purchase of an asset, large outlays are often
· made to repair and renovate the property. In a sense, it is arguable
that such expenditures should be capitalized because they produce an
asset materially different from the one originally purchased. By applying this rationale, one can argue that the new unit criterion (discussed
in Part II above) has been met; and there is, thus, strong underlying
logic for contending that appreciable charges incurred contemporaneously with an asset's purchase·warrant a capitalization. In spite of this
strong underlying logic, the courts have not been completely consistent
in their rulings.
Thus, in one case,95 extensive steamship repairs were made shortly
after a vessel's acquisition; and in three other cases,96 repairs were made
to buildings in varying degrees of deterioration. In each of these instances, expense deductions were permitted by the court in spite of the
fact that these repairs were extensive and were made almost •immediately after purchase of the property.
On the other hand, costs of papering and painting a house purchased for rental purposes to make ~t more suitable for tenants were
held capitalized.97
95 Osage Steamship Co., Ltd., 3 B.T.A. 141 (acq.) (1925).
96 Mobile Register, Inc., 18 B.T.A. 682 (1930); J. Bentley Squier, 13 B.T.A. 1223
(1928); Treat Hardware Corp., 6 B.T.A. 768 (acq.) (1927).
·
97Appeal of Louis Allen, 2 B.T.A. 1313 (acq.) (1925).
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There is not too much judicial authority on the matter of contemporaneousness, and what small amount of authority there is arose
some twenty years ago when both accounting concepts and tax laws
were very much in a process of crystallization. For these reasons, past
authority cannot be assigned too much weight; furthermore, to disregard contemporaneousness is to disregard, in many cases, the leading
doctrine of the Illinois Merchants Trust Co. case.98 Thus, a taxpayer,
through the subterfuge of considerable repairs made shortly after an
asset's purchase, would be allowed to produce an asset worth more in
value, possessing greater usefulness, and in even different form than
the property originally acquired. To permit these expenditures to be
revenue charges is to produce an incongruous situation, and one that
is in discord with the remaining fabric of tax jurisprudence.
In summary, a small amount of past authority seems to indicate that
contemporaneousness is immaterial. It should be noted that this doctrine is not a firmly embedded one by any means, and might quite
easily be modified by future decisions. From a logical standpoint, large
outlays made shortly after an asset's purchase practically always produce
an asset materially different from the one purchased; and for this
reason, these outlays should accordingly be capitalized.

VI
CoMPREHENSIVE PLAN op REcoNDITIONING

Cases have arisen whereby a court has stated that a broad comprehensive plan of reconditioning will justify a capitalization of the entire
expenditure. Here, there seems to be somewhat of an application of
the theory of merger, so that ancillary revenue charges become merged
with the capital costs. This notion was expressed in Coca-Cola Bottling
W orks99 where the court required capitalization of an entire outlay
because "it was pursuant to a general plan of reconditioning, improving,
and altering the property as a whole to make it suitable for the taxpayer's purpose."100
This view of comprehensiveness appeared in even stronger language in two other cases.101 In Home News Publishing Co.102 the
98 4

B.T.A. 103 (acq.) (1926). For a more detailed treatment of this case, see Part

I above.
19 B.T.A. 1055 (1930).
1056.
News Publishing Co., 18 B.T.A. 1008 (1930); Cowell, 18 B.T.A. 997
(1930).
.
102 18 B.T.A. 1008 (1930).
99

100 Id. at
1 01 Home
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court stated: "While certain portions of the work done may, standing
alone, have properly been classified as repairs, all the work was a part
of the same general scheme, and we do not believe -qnder the facts
that certain particular items should be separated and classified as re•
"103
.
pru.rs.
Also, in In re Cowell104 the taxpayer was not permitted to charge
one-third of the outlays to expenses, and the court stated:
·
'While the characterization of some of the items is such that
standing alone or made as periodic repairs they might be deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses, it is impractical from
the evidence to make such a detailed classification of the items.
Such a classification is not a mere matter of what an item is called,
but whether it is a part of the entire capital investment ,in the improved property. To fix a door or patch plaster might very well be
treated as an expense when it is an incidental minor item arising
-in the use of the property in carrying on a business, and yet, as
here, be properly capitalized when involved in a greater plan of
rehabilitation, enlargement, and improvement of the entire property ."105
In each of the above instances the court invoked the doctrine of
comprehensiveness, viz., a comprehensive plan causes a merger of what
would otJierwise be repair items with the capitalized costs. In this respect, a close examination oI the contextual facts of each of the outlays involved106 will reveal that such expenditures would have qualified as capital charges under other basic criteria. The invocation of the
comprehensive doctrine was not absolutely essential to the decision of
these cases.
·
In contrast and comparison with the language of the above cases,
there have been numerous cases permitting an apportionment between
revenue and capital, where adequate accounting data was available .
. This apportionment doctrine will be discussed in detail in Part VII
below, and, as will be noted then, there is a creditable amount of au103 Id.
104 18
105 Id.
106 In

at 1010.
B.T.A. 997 (1930).
at 1002.
Cocoa-Cola Bottling Works, 19 B.T.A. 1055 (1930) the outlay was for the
replacement of the front and side walls of a building. This, therefore, constituted a new
unit replacing an old unit that had been completely removed. In Home News Publishing
Co., 18 B.T.A. 1008 (1930), and Cowell, 18 B.T.A. 997 (1930), the expenditures were
made to recondition and make useful an otherwise unserviceable asset. Accordingly, this
met the criteria of· placing an unserviceable asset in ·a useful condition. These two criteria
are discussed above in Parts II and IV respectively.
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thority sanctioning an apportionment if it is predicated on sufficient
supporting evidence.
The apportionment doctrine seems to refute the comprehensiveness
theory. In all probability, this comprehensive doctrine was intended
to mean that partially worn-out assets become capitalized once completely replaced with a substantial, major part of the main asset. For
example, the replacement of a few isolated bricks is a repair, but an
entire wall becomes capitalized. If this is the intent of the comprehensive doctrine, then it is merely another way of expressing the new
unit criterion. The reason for the capitalization, though, is that a new
unit has been added-not the merger (of repairs) effect of a comprehensive plan.
The cases mentioning the comprehensive theory are few in number
and old in age. In view of this situation along with the vast amount of
authority sustaining the acceptability of apportionments, it is doubtful
whether much credence should be given to the comprehensive approach.
In summary, comprehensiveness is not a doctrine that should carry
much weight (if any) as a criterion. However, because it has a certain
deceptively logical twist about it, the doctrine should be approached
cautiously.

VII
.APPORTIONMENT OF EXPENDITURES

Strictly speaking, apportionment is not one of the basic criteria,
but it is nevertheless very closely related to them. Thus, apportionment
affects the determination of the exact amount to be allocated between
capital costs and revenue charges, and in this way bears a close affinity
to the basic criteria. For this reason, the problem of apportionment is
deemed germane, and accordingly has been included in the discussion
of the present analysis.
There have been many cases arising in which a taxpayer has made
expenditures resulting in charges that were partially capital items and
partially revenue outlays; and further, many of these expenditures were
made under circumstances where the capital and revenue items could
not be segregated.107 In substance, accounting charges have been so
101 J. H. Sanford, 2 B.T.A. 181 (1925); Appeal of Sentinel Publishing Co., 2 B.T.A.
1211 (1925); Modesto Lumber Co., 5 B.T.A. 598 (1926); Federal Plate Glass Co., 6
B.T.A. 351 (1927); Woods and Sons Co., 8 B.T.A. 705 (1927); H.B. Moore, 8 B.T.A.

228

MicmGAN LAw R:avmw

[ Vol. 49

commingled that it was virtually impossible to segregate the capital
debits from the revenue debits. Where this situation has arisen, the
courts have clearly stated that the commissioner could elect to treat
such items as either revenue or capital charges,1° 8 and relatively recent
cases have affirmed this view.109 This election given to the commissioner
arises out of the procedural aspect of the Internal Revenue Code110
which places upon the taxpayer the burden of rebutting the commissioner's determinations. Thus, the commissioner establishes a capital
classification for an entire outlay (because the records are so confused
that it is impossible to segregate the revenue charges from the capital
items). Since the taxpayer is unable to rebut such a finding with adequate accounting data, the commissioner's ruling continues undisturbed.
In this respect, it should be noted that accounting data really involves two aspects. First, there are the actual books of entry that summarize business transactions, and, secondly, there are the evidentiary
vouchers that support the entries or computations made in these books
of entry. Good tax practice means the availability of good evidence, and
good evidence, in tum, means the availability of adequate accounting
data. Where a problem of apportionment is involved, accounting evidence is undoubtedly the most important factor affecting the outcome
of a decision, and this aspect of the case should accordingly receive the
greatest amount of emphasis.
In the past, the commissioner has ordinarily elected to compel a
capitalization111 where only inadequate accounting data was available.
This election has been sustained by the courts, even where an undetermined part of the costs admittedly was for repairs, but could not be
749 (1927); Ind. Stove Works, 8 B.T.A. 1008 (1927); Edwin Dumble Co., 9 B.T.A. 591
(1927); Federal-American National Bank, 9 B.T.A. 1043 (1928); Seletha 0. Thompson,
9 B.T.A. 1342 (1928); Southern Press Cloth Mfg. Co., 10 B.T.A. 303 (1928); Hubbard,
et al., 7 T.C.M. 369 (1948); Tovrea Land and Cattle Co., 10 T.C. 90 (1948); Manger
Hotel Corp., 10 T.C. 520 (1948).
10s Ibid.
109 Manger

Hotel Corp., 10 T.C. 520 (1948); Tovrea Land and Cattle Co., 10 T.C.
90 (1948); Hubbard, et al., 7 T.C.M. 369 (1948).
110 I.R.C., §§57 and 271; Treas. Regs. 111, §29.272-1.
111 This has usually, of course, resulted in an immediate higher tax. However, a capitalization permits taking small depreciation or amortization debits annually each subsequent
year until the cost of the asset has been recovered in expense debits-provided, of course,
these debits qualify as deductible expenses under the Internal Revenue Code. The procedure for effecting these debits and their effect on taxable income is discussed in greater
detail in Part I above.
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segregated.112 Speaking in this vein, an early opinion113 of the Board of
Tax Appeals stated: "It is possible that a certain portion of the amount
expended did represent repairs, but, in the absence of any definite information with reference to the amount which was actually expended
in repair work, we are unable to determine what amount is properly
deductible. "114
Where the taxpayer is forced to capitalize admitted repairs, his only
tax remedy, if any, is to recover depreciation tax expense deductions in
subsequent years.115 Thus, instead of obtaining an immediate deduction, he may possibly receive small annual deductions parcelled out over
a period of future years.116
At the same time, it should be noted that a number of cases have
allowed an apportionment between capital and revenue charges where
the taxpayer was able to produce enough accounting evidence to support a segregation of the two.117 Apportion~ents have further been
allowed in rather difficult situations simply because the taxpayer was
armed with enough accounting data to sustain his statutory burden.
For example, an apportionment was permitted where a taxpayer rebuilt
a part of a train trestle and repaired the rest of the structure.118 Likewise, an apportionment was permitted where a taxpayer repaired a
road and at the same time effected extensions to the road.119 These
cases demonstrate that apportionments are possible where the taxpayer
is prepared with proper evidence to support a pro-rating between capital and revenue outlays.
In this respect, also, it is immaterial what intermediate accounting
mechanics are followed as long as the :final apportionment is accurate.120 Thus, all charges may be debited to an expense account and
the capital items pro-rated from this account at the end of the year;
112 Greeson, 4 T.C.M. 605 (1945); Alexander Sprunt and Sons, Inc., 24 B.T.A. 599
(1931); North Street Trust, 6 B.T.A. 947 (acq.) (1927); Appeal of Strauss Market, Inc.,
2 B.T.A. 1264 (1925); Appeal of Sentinel Publishing Co., 2 B.T.A. 1211 (1925).
113 Appeal of Sentinel Publishing Co., 2 B.T.A. 1211 (1925).
114Jd. at 1217.
115 Appeal of Strauss Market, Inc., 2 B.T.A. 1264 (1925).
116 See Part I above for a discussion of this accounting procedure.
111 J. Bentley Squier, 13 B.T.A. 1223 (1928); Mogg Coal and Coke Co., 10 B.T.A.
588 (acq.) (1928); Alexander Mfg. Co., 9 B.T.A. 347 (acq.) (1927); Hermalbrecht, 6
B.T.A. 1091 (acq.) (1927); Modesto Lumber Co., 5 B.T.A. 598 (1926).
11s Mogg Coal and Coke Co., 10 B.T.A. 588 (acq.) (1928).
119 Alexander Mfg. Co., 9 B.T.A. (1927).
120 Flexible File Co., 13 B.T.A. 909 (acq.) (1928); Beacon Coal Co., 9 B.T.A. 280
(acq.) (1927); Stillwater Milling Co., 5 B.T.A. 280 (acq.) (1926).
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all charges may be debited to a capital asset and the expenses pro-rated
from this asset at the end of the year; or all charges may be debited to a
suspense account and the entire suspense account apportioned between
capital assets and current expenses. Likewise, even where a revenue
charge was erroneously capitalized, the error "may be corrected later
and the charges considered as an expense deduction,1 21 provided, of
course, that the statute of limitations has not intervened. Accounting
mechanics, per se, though, cannot convert a charge from one category
to the other. Thus, repairs were deductible even though paid out of a
fund originally planned for capital expenditures.122 The nature of the
outlay, in reality, determines its categorization. Accounting data may
be used to prove facts to which existing tax law can be applied-but
such entries may not be used as a fulcrum to change the law.
In summary, apportionment is not, strictly speaking, one of the
basic criteria. However, because apportionment is often used in determining amounts that are pro-rated between capital and revenue charges,
it is deemed pertinent to the general problem under consideration. Accounting data, which include both the books of entry apd the evidentiary vouchers, is the ammunition that a taxpayer must use to defend
his apportionment. The more ammunition a taxpayer has, both in
quantum and variety, the better will be his expectations of success. At
the same time, accounting data (in order to be sustained as a basis for
tax computations) must still accurately reflect existing tax law.

VIII
CoNSUMPTION OF

AN

AssET WrrmN THE YEAR PtmcHAsED

There are many cases stating that the entire cost of an asset shall
be an expense where the asset is completely consumed or discarded
within its year of purchase;123 and, too often, the impression obtained
is that the initjal cost is the expense. For example, under this view,
a $10,000 cash purchase of an asset results in an immediate debit to
an expense account and a credit to cash. This is not at all a correct
reflection of facts. The original cost is still capitalized. However, at
the end of the year, the entire value of the asset is depreciated; so that
the expense item becomes a depreciation debit rather than the expense
121 Reese Drilling Co., 18 B.T.A. 816 (acq.) (1930).
122 Henri Chouteau, B.T.A. Memo. Op., Dkts. 46,755
1 23 Buedingen, 6 B.T.A. 335 (acq.) (1927); American

5 B.T.A. 954 (acq.) (1926).

and 51,897, May 3, 1933.
Show and Entertainment Co.,
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item being composed of the direct, original cost of the asset. For example, assume that the above $10,000 asset was purchased on March 1.
On purchase, the asset account would be debited for $10,000 and cash
would be credited for the same amount. On December 31, when the
adjusting entries are made, depreciation expense is debited $10,000 and
the depreciation reserve is correspondingly credited - whereupon the
asset's book value becomes zero.
Regardless of which of the above two accounting methods is followed, there is a final $10,000 expense item, and the final net taxable
income amount is the same. For very practical reasons it is still important to follow correct accounting concepts in comprehending this result.
Thus, there is a dangerous innuendo that life beyond a single fiscal
year warrants capitalization,124 where one indulges in the fallacious
explanation that asset costs (for property lasting a single year) are
charged, on purchase, to expense accounts. This innuendo was expressed in a recent case125 wherein the court stated: "The construction
of new buildings, the replacement of a roof on a house, etc., are capital
expenditures for the reason that the life of such improvements extends
over a period of years."126
The opinion seems to indicate that any outlay whose effects "extend over a period of years" is capitalizable. Actually, most repairs supply some economic utilities that extend over into subsequent years, and
the general tax structure permits this where other criteria have been
met. For example, a single shingle on a roof usually lasts longer than a
year, and yet there is abundant authority stating that it is a repair.127
Should the "one-year test" be applied strictly, virtually all outlays would
have to be capitalized-a result obviously not intended either by the
Internal Revenue Code or Regulations. 128
In summary, a qualified asset1 29 consumed during the year of its
purchase clearly results in an expense equal to the asset's cost. However, where economic utilities will be enjoyed in subsequent years, the
12-1 Mills, 4 T.C.M. 863 (1945); W. B. Harbeson Lumber Co., 24 B.T.A. 542
(1931); also, 4 MERTENS LAw OF FEDERAL lNcoME TAXATION §25.17, at pp. 337-338
(1942) states: "If the result of the expenditure is the acquisition of an asset which has an
economically useful life beyond the taxable year, no deduction may be obtained under this •
provision of the statute. • • . Where an asset will last beyond a taxable year, deductions
must be obtainable by deductions for amortization, depreciation, depletion, or loss."
125 Mills, 4 T.C.M. 863 (1945).
126 Id. at 863. Also see W. B. Harbeson Lumber Co., 24 B.T.A. 542 (1931).
127 For example, see Kingsley, 11 B.T.A. 296 (acq.) (1928).
128 See I.R.C.,§23(a); Treas. Regs. 111, §29.23(a)-l to 29.23(e)-16 incl.
129Ibid.
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asset may or may not be charged to revenue - depending on other
crjteria. The one-year test described above, like "contemporaneousness," has a certain deceptive twist about it; and, like "contemporaneousness," it should be approached cautiously.130

IX
THE INDIVIDUAL ITEM CATEGORIZATION

The individual item approach encompasses selecting a specific item
(e.g., door, window, foundation for a building, or wall structure) and
stating that the installation of any such a specific item shall be categorized as either a capital or revenue cost-regardless of the circumstances of its installation. Unfortunately, it has not been possible for
the courts to take specific items of this sort and rigidly classify them.
This would, in substance, amount to the application of a doctrine of
stare decisis on a per item basis. For example, such a stare decisis approach has developed in the case of new roofs, and in a recent case
one court said: "The decisions are uniform that a new roof is a capital
item not chargeable to expense."131
Some items may, in the future, assume such a stare decisis position,
but to date new roofs seem to be the only type of expenditure to have
achieved this distinction. By the nature of things, it is too much to
expect that very many more will achieve such a definite classification;
an~ for the great bulk of expenditures, the facts of the outlay will continue to be important. The problem is closely analogous to the problem of context in the study of philology. For example, when one uses
· " or
nng,"does one mean "·
nng of a bll""
e , a wedding nng,
the word "·
"a ring of thieves"? The precise meaning must be determined from the
context. Likewise, in expenditures, the tax ·meaning must be deduced
from the context of facts.
In summary, a few individual items may possibly take on a stare
decisis, individual item categorization in the future, just as new roofs132
have already done. Undoubtedly, these items will remain few in number, and development in this direction will be inhibited by the necessity
for factual contexts. This sort of an individual item status carries with
it an element of definiteness or certainty and for this reason satisfies one
of the most important requirements of wholesome tax law. Such a de130 For a consideration of the doctrine of "contemporaneousness" as a possible criteria,
see Part V above.
131 Ritter, 5 T.C.M. 849 (1946).
1a2Jbid.
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velopment towards definiteness may, accordingly, be regarded as desirable, where it is possible.

X
SIZE OF

AN IDENDITURE

The size of the outlay is not particularly indicative of its classification. In fact, a close examination of the adjudicated cases will indicate
a tremendous span between amounts, both for capital expenditure and,
revenue charge rulings. Also, the proportion of repairs to the asset's
total cost seems to be immaterial, and in recent years fairly large ratios
have been permitted. For example, a 1945 case133 permitted a revenue
charge where the expenditure amounted to about 25% of the asset's
original cost, and a 1946 case134 permitted a revenue charge equalling
approximately 35% of the asset's cost. A court may occasionally suggest
that a large expenditure is somewhat indicative of a capital item whereas
a small outlay is similarly somewhat indicative of a revenue charge.135
However, such a view is expressed only sporadically, and the cases are
legion where courts have refused to consider the amount involved as
pertinent.
In summary, the size of the expenditure may be considered as a
buttressing criteria. In full fairness to the situation, however, it finds
no particular place in the general symmetry of tax jurisprudence, and
has been refuted in recent years.

XI
REPETITIVENESS OF

AN

EXPENDITURE

The fact that an expenditure is made repetitively o~ recurrently
influences its being classified as a revenue charge.136 This influence
becomes particularly accentuated where the same type of expenditure
must necessarily be repeated annually in order to maintain the asset
in a serviceable condition.137
It should be emphasized that, whereas repetitiveness of the same
kind of expenditure tends to establish a revenue charge, the absence of
133 Appollo Steel Co., 4 T.C.M. 387 (1945).
134 Buckland v. United States, (D.C. Conn. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 681.
135 Connally Realty Co. v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d) 221.
136 Salo Auerbach, 2 B.T.A. 67 (acq.) (1925).
137
Bentley Squier, 13 B.T.A. 1223 (1928); Peoples Ice and Cold Storage
B.T.A. 16 (1928). Also, see 4 MERTENS, LAw oF FEDERAL INcoMS TAXATION 337

J.

Co., 10
(1942)
wherein it is stated: ''This section (23a of the Internal Revenue Code) ••• is intended
primarily, although not always necessarily, to cover expenditures of a recurring nature••••"
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such repetitiveness does not in and of itself tend to establish a capital
cost. Frequently, non-repetitive outlays have been allowed as revenue
charges because they satisfied other criteria. Thus, repairs occasioned
by accidents,1 38 excessive or abnormal use,139 and damages caused by
the installation of new equipment1 40 have all been held to be revenue
charges-even though they were not of a repetitive nature.
Likewise, it should be stated with equal emphasis that repetitiveness per se will not establish a revenue charge where the outlay, by
other criteria, is clearly a capital cost. For example, a factory could not
establish long-life warehouse expenditures as revenue charges merely
by adopting the policy of building a new warehouse each year.
In summary, repetitiveness may be considered essentially as a buttressing criteria. Where other criteria are present, repetitiveness may be
coupled with them and thereby form a reinforcing ingredient. Where
thus coupled, it can perform a valuable service by helping to classify
an otherwise nebulous expenditure.
·

XII
GOVERNMENTAL COMPULSION, SUGGESTION, OR INDIRECT COERCION

On occasions, alterations of assets have been effected at the compulsion or suggestion of governmental authorities. The motivating
force has come from both federal and state (and local) authorities. 141
Also, in one instance the taxpayer had to make major alterations in a
building because a contiguous street had been raised by the city.142
Here, the taxpayer was indirectly coerced into making outlays, since
they were necessary in order for him to be able to continue using his
property.
In all instances, the courts have refused to be influenced in holding an outlay either capitalizable or immediately expendable merely
because such an outlay was attributable to governmental pressure.
Rather, the courts have resorted to the other criteria in making their
categorizations of the expenditures. Thus, the following were required
to be capitalized: factory alterations that improved lighting conditions in
138 J. F. Wilcox and Sons, 28 B.T.A. 878 (nonacq.) (1933); Henderson Cotton
Mills, 4 B.T.A. 1212 (acq.) (1926).
139 Consumer's Coal Co., 10 B.T.A. 851 (1928).
140 National Weeklies, Inc., B.T.A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 98,315, Feb. 8, 1941.
141 Federal authority: Parkersburg Iron and Steel Co. v. Burnet, ( 4th Cir. 1931)
48 F. (2d) 163; State authority: Holt-Granite Mills Co., 1 B.T.A. 1246 (1925); Local
authority: Lycoming Silk Co., 11 B.T.A. 523 (1928).
142Connally Realty Co. v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d) 221.
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a factory engaged in war production and that were made at the request
of the United States Army;143 reconstruction of an electric lighting
system to meet the approval of county inspectors;144 sanitary improvements required by law;145 major alterations of a building necessitated
by a raising of a contiguous street;146 rewiring a plant by order of local
fire inspectors;147 replacement of an oil burner with a coal burner pursuant to wartime regulations;148 and miscellaneous structural repairs required by a building inspector.149 In some of these situations, the
alteration was made as a result of wartime necessity,1 50 and in one instance the modification was made to aid in increasing the production of
war materials themselves.151 Here, too, the court refused to consider
the exigencies of the national emergency as a factor, and the classification of the outlay was controlled by other criteria. The taxpayer was
left to look to other sections, if any, of the Internal Revenue Code for
special dispensations because of these wartime conditions.
In these cases, as elsewhere,1 52 the court was not concerned with
the fact that the alterations instigated by the government made the
property less valuable153 or of less economic usefulness154 to its owner.
There is one noteworthy case,1 55 where plant modifications had been
used for some two decades since their original wartime installation, and
the court noted that the taxpayer had never made any attempt to abandon
these alterations. They were accordingly held capitalizable. By innuendo, there is somewhat of an intimation that continued use of an
alteration precludes or estops the taxpayer from contending that it is
an expendable revenue charge. By deduction from this innuendo, one
might contend that a timely abandonment of a wartime alteration (made
because of government instigation) would tend to establish it as a
143 Parkersburg Iron and Steel Co. v. Burnet, ( 4th Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 163.
144 Hunter, 2 T.C.M. 502 (1943).
145 Holt-Granite Mills Co., 1 B.T.A. 1246 (1925).
146 Connally Realty Co. v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d) 221.
141 Lycoming Silk Co., 11 B.T.A. 523 (1928).
148 Beaven, 6 T.C.M. 1344 (1947).
149 John A. Schmid, 10 B.T.A. 1152 (acq.) (1928).
150 Parkersburg Iron and Steel Co. v. Burnet, ( 4th Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 163; Beaven,

6 T.C.M. 1344 (1927).
151Parkersburg Iron and Steel Co. v. Burnet, (4th Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 163.
152 See Part II above.
153 Connally Realty Co. v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d) 221; Beaven,
6 T.C.M. 1344 (1947).
154 Parkersburg Iron and Steel Co. v. Burnet, ( 4th Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 163,
wherein the alteration necessitated a provision for additional storage space, and caused
cramped, congested operating conditions.
155 Ibid.
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revenue charge. Such a deduction, although possible, would indeed be
a weak one. It would, in substance, be a deduction based on an innuendo, with the innuendo being predicated on dicta. The indirect
method by which such a deduction must be established unquestionably
saps its efficacy-particularly, since only one case156 seems to be available supporting this view.
In summary, courts seem to have attached no importance157 to governmental compulsion, suggestion, or indirect coercion. Based on past
proceedings, these governmental factors may be safely disregarded in
the analysis of the proper categorization of an expenditure.158
CoNCLUSION

These are the basic criteria.159 Each has been enumerated and each
has been evaluated, both as to relative weight assigned by the courts
and as to relative appropriateness to the fabric of tax law. It would
be a rare case indeed that offered an application of each one of the
criteria, but any case will involve at least one or more of them. In
this respect, a careful study of the facts involved in an individual case,
a careful application of the criteria, and a respect for the relative weight
of the criteria utilized should do much to reduce the volume of litigation that has been generated by this question. This is a worth-while
objective, and it is an attainable one as well.
156 Ibid.
157 With the exception of Parkersburg Iron and Steel Co. v. Burnet which, as noted
above, forms very weak authority for a contrary view.
158 The decision of Hunter, 2 T.C.M. 502 (1943) and Beaven, 6 T.C.M. 1344
(1947), both in recent years and both following previously established views, seem to
indicate a current affirmation of the immateriality of these governmental pressures.
159 For a further discussion of the problem of distinguishing capital expenditures from
revenue charges see: 1 MoNTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXEs-:--CoRPORATIONS AND PARTNER•.
smPs 442-464 (1948-1949); MAGILL, TAXABLE INcoME, rev. ed., 219 (1945); HENDERSON,
lNrnonuCTioN TO INcoME TAXATION, 2d ed., §71 et seq. and §282 et seq. (1949); 4
MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL lNcoME TAXATION §25.30 et seq. (1942); STANLEY AND
KILCULLEN, THE FEDERAL INcoME TAX LAw 53 et seq. (1948); PAUL, Snroms IN FEDERAL
TAXATION, 3d series, (1940).
·

